Investing so much power into one invidivual required both immense degrees of trust from the emperor. Either they would need to be unquestioned in their legitimacy, as the 10th century Macedonians were, or they needed to earn that legitimacy through conquest, such as Romanos I Lekapenos had to. Tellingly, Nikephoros Phokas would remain the lead general during his time as emperor; Nikephoros jealously guarded his role as the bringer-of-victory, even punishing Michael Bourtzes for capturing Antioch, which Nikephoros had longed to do. Michael Bourtzes would have the last laugh though when he helped John Tzimiskes decapitate Nikephoros not long after that. The obvious reasoning for Nikephoros' actions here was that he lacked the legitimacy to let someone else take over so, for example, he had to sideline John Tzimiskes after the Cilician campaigns.
Jumping to A.D. 945, Constantine VII had just become sole ruler and needed to appoint loyal retainers to the lead military positions. Enter the Phokades. According to Skylitzes, Nikephoros and Leo were some of the retainers who helped Constantine VII in deposing the Lekapenoi brothers. That action didn't come to bloodshed, but their willingness to risk themselves personally made an impression on Constantine. Therefore Constantine VII essentially stripped out the previous leadership of the military and made Bardas the Domestic, Nikephoros, Leo, and Constantine [Phokas] strategoi of the Anatolikon, Cappadocia, and Seleucia respectively. By doing this, Constantine solved his immediate political situation, but created the longer term political problem of the state's monopoly on violence in Anatolia coming to be controlled by one family, the Phokas clan. (Even more so, if John Tzimiskes is included in this list!) Fortunately, this problem was delayed by Bardas Phokas' inability to defeat Sayf al-Dawla in pitched battle.
How effective was Bardas Phokas as a general? This is a tough one to judge, especially as the sources are scant on detail, but is important for our understanding of Nikephoros' capability. Bardas had been a very capable general in his earlier days, notably playing a key role in defeating a Rus invasion, however, he clearly struggled against Sayf al-Dawla, losing at Marash in 953 and Adata in 954. Was this a product of Bardas' age, Skylitzes' paraphrased criticism that Bardas could handle tactics, but not strategy, or that Sayf al-Dawla was just really very capable himself? I lean primarily, but not exclusively, towards Sayf's competency. Sayf al-Dawla would war with the Byzantines from between A.D. 936 and A.D. 967 and poor generals typically die far earlier than their third decade of combat.
Regardless of why, Bardas was retired, after losing at Adata in 954 and his eldest son, our very own Nikephoros Phokas, was appointed as Domestic of the Schools.
Interlude: A new book I've literally just found that I have far too much sense to buy with the money available to me right now. https://brill.com/view/title/38214 If any generous readers do have a spare £150, I have none of these texts and this blog would reach new and unparalleled heights! If not, then I'll keep on using the 5-10 sources I already have, as there's frankly not much competition right now for the best blog on Nikephoros Phokas.
There's a fascinating extract from the non-contemporary historian John Zonaras that I will relate in full:
The story goes that at the beginning of the reign of Romanos, the emperor was driven to despair by the Agarenes (Arabs) laying waste to all the land and that Nikephoros Phokas had been summoned to tell him why the Byzantine fortunes had been reversed. He held nothing back and spoke his mind freely, “It is because you are emperor and my father in in charge of the army. You do not exercise power the way you should, while he is a profiteer. If you truly desire it, the performance of the Byzantines will be transformed, only this change will not take place at once,” When the emperor heard these words, he authorised Phokas to deal with the situation as he wished. He immediately took charge of the army, marshalling the existing forces, raising others and training them thoroughly in the conduct of war. And so he filled the ranks and armed tillers of the soil, applying to them inversely the words of the prophet, “beating their ploughshares into swords and their pruning-hooks into lances,” and with these men he went on to achieve his celebrated victories with little trouble.
What to draw from this then? Firstly, that our access to Wikipedia makes fact-checking much easier, as Nikephoros became domestic under Constantine VII, not Constantine's son Romanos II. Secondly the reputation with which Nikephoros was held, especially going into the next century, which oversaw tremendous territorial decline as opposed to the 10th century. As Robin Pierson commented in the truly excellent History of Byzantium podcast, Zonaras' comment is surely apocryphal, however, the state of the army really did reverse itself after Nikephoros took charge. Finally, it's a fun comment and I have many more of those that I've gathered over the last year - if it is apocryphal, it matches the personality that I draw for Nikephoros when I read other better-cited quotes.
No comments:
Post a Comment