On the 9th of November, Romanos II, the legitimate Macedonian heir, ascended to the Purple. As I've mentioned previously, Romanos II took an arguably more expansionist policy than the "glorification-through-victory" policy of his father. Before his death, Constantine VII had been putting together a fleet and army to attempt another conquest of Crete; certainly the failures of his 949 expedition would have weighed heavily on the planning and execution of this attempt. The leadership of the role was desired, for example, Basil Lekapenos wrote a naval treatise (the Naumachika of Basil Lekapenos) on the specifications and capabilities of the ships of the Byzantine navy in an attempt to secure this amphibious action. However, this plumb job was given to Nikephoros Phokas. The choice seems obvious, as Nikephoros was the most experienced general of the Romans and the four previous failed expeditions were evidence that this was a job for a professional soldier, despite the risks of making one other man too powerful. Interestingly, Romanos II's promotion of Leo Phokas to Domestic of the West and the change of Nikephoros from Domestic to Domestic of the East could maybe be seen as a counterbalancing of power, but that doesn't really make sense, as the Phokas family loyalty would win out. Crete is the largest island in the Aegean, but to take Crete, you really had to just take its capital, Chandax, which was the only walled settlement of any strategic value - I make this statement based on the fact that nowhere else of importance is mentioned.
I could talk about the narrative events that occured throughout the siege, but, in a way, I've already done that. Below is the link to a video that I researched, animated, and narrated on this event: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=264Kfd5g0IY
It's seven minutes long and called "The Byzantine Conquest of Crete, 960-961" for anyone who can't make the link work. Have you watched it? Good, so you're all up to speed on the events that happened in the siege.
(For anything further Wikipedia has some very good detail of what Leo the Deacon states too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Chandax )
I'll give a brief recap and then use it as a platform to talk around the subject. Crete had been taken from the emprie in the 820s and there had been four previous attempts to retake Crete between then and the 960s. Most notably, there was a failed attempt in 949 by Constantine VII, Romanos II's father. This attempt and the attempt in 911 are important as we have the full breakdown of the number of ships and soldiers from which Theme that the Byzantines used, which is interesting. Further, the failed 949 invasion would clearly have loomed large in the minds of military establishment. As we've said before, Bardas Phokas was Domestic of the Schools from 945 and Nikephoros was arguably second-in-command of the land armies, by heading the Anatolikon Theme. It seems that Nikephoros was able to secure more men and materiel from Romanos, whether from Nikephoros being a more competent administrator or from Romanos being more eager, and a large expedition was put together.
I've said in my video that this is likely 40,000 soldiers in total of whom 8,000 are soldiers and 32,000 supporting staff (e.g. rowing the ships, sailors for the blockade etc), let's talk about a comparison. When Justinian sent an invasion force to take North Africa in A.D. 533, there were around 20,000 soldiers and some 80,000 supporting staff. I personally haven't read the sources for the time period, but for Basiliscus' failed invasion of Africa in A.D. 468, with the utterly disastrous naval battle at Cap Bon, was meant to have 100,000 soldiers and 400,000 supporting staff. This is where I've taken the 4:1 ratio from that I used, but it's fundamentally a guess on my part so be aware of that. Let's talk about the numbers too. Basiliscus commanded reportedly many hundreds of thousands, which was essentially the combined force of the East and essentially the Italian peninsula - this bankrupted the East for a decade and was absolutely the point of no return for the West. Justinian with the resources of the East (at a fundamentally healthy time of its existence) could put together an expedition of a hundred thousand with a 1-2 years of planning. The diminished Byzantine state of essentially Anatolia and Greece again spent about 1-2 years planning and could put together forty thousand. I can accept these numbers as being intuitively consistent.
With all that said, Nikephoros reached the island, setting up a naval blockade of Chandax, as its on the coast. From there, he may have had to fight his way off of the ships or not, depending on which sources you believe. There's a curious anecote in Leo the Deacon about Pastilas, an officer of the Nikephoros Phokas' army, leading some "picked men" and attempting to secure the island, but becoming drunk and being ambushed. Then, Nikephoros is said to have done what they couldn't and successfully secure the island. This story could be almost entirely made up for literary effect or it could be true - more likely, it's there to highlight Nikephoros Phokas' positive characteristics that he was always vigilant and sober and able to control his men, unlike the scoundrel Pastilas. As it happens, this isn't entirely made up, Theodosius the Deacon describes Pastilas, at a later point in the siege, being dispatched by Phokas to deal with Cretans outside the walls, but he's ambushed and killed - no getting drunk this time. Nikephoros was said to have built a comprehensive circumvallating wall with a ditch and palisade around Chandax to protect his forces and really tighten the noose on the siege. I must admit that I've not seen this happening in Byzantine histories before or after this event, but I'm not an expert; it's certainly a product of the instilled disclipline and size of this force that this was done. Sort of reminds me of the good old fashioned Roman times...
I'd like to emphasise the effort that Nikephoros put in to training and encouraging his men throughout the eight months of siege,. All of the sources describe his attention to detail, vigour, and care for the common soldiery, keeping them active, partly by building that aforementioned wall, and letters between Crete and the capital are mentioned by Pseudo-Symeon and Theodosius. This was especially useful as grain ships were needed to support the forces over the 960-961 Winter, which was bitterly cold.
On March 6th 961, Nikephoros launched a massive assault. Using stone-throwing equipment (meaning proto-trebuchets) to suprress defenders on the wall and presumably to have damaged any cladding beforehand, siege engineers sapped underneath portions of the wall and burnt out the supports leading to a collapse of a long section of wall. The extensive training worked, as the army was not repulsed before this could happen. The army stormed the city and Nikephoros did what he could to prevent uncessary civillian deaths - the success of this action isn't recorded by Leo the Deacon. Regardless, Nikephoros' retainers secured the Emir of Crete and his son, Anemas, who would convert to Christianity and die fighting for John I Tzimiskes in 971. Chandax was taken and Crete was reconquered for the Byzantine Empire.
No comments:
Post a Comment